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In South Africa, a water scarce country, conflict between water users is mounting, while 
there are few remaining bulk water augmentation options. Water demand management is 
thus increasingly taking centre stage in water management debates. Water pricing is 
regarded as an important component of managing the demand for water resources. This 
article traces the efficacy of increasing irrigation water tariffs to save water and the impact 
thereof on the national economy and the Western Cape economy using the Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model and Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) constructed by 
Hassan et al (2008). Two scenarios are investigated in which the water tariff is increased by 
50 percent from a base of 2c/m³. In the first scenario water demand is fixed in agriculture; 
thus, water needs to be fully utilized in agriculture. In the second scenario it is assumed that 
all water does not have to be utilized. The study finds that, for both scenarios, increasing 
water tariffs by 50% raises the risk profile of agriculture, threatens food security, decreases 
national welfare, increases imports of staple foods, increases the prices of staple foods, 
decreases household welfare and decreases employment in agriculture. These adverse effects 
are more severe in the second scenario than in the first scenario. The introduction of 
irrigation water pricing shocks should thus be approached with due caution and alternative 




As a scarce resource water may become the limiting factor to national development; and, the 
scarcity of water is set to increase in the future due to demographic pressures, socio-
economic pressures and climate change (Blignaut & van Heerden, 2009). Water scarcity has 
severe implications for food security and the structure of agriculture. Water is already a key 
constraint to the development of agriculture in particular, but urban water users have a higher 
willingness to pay than agricultural water users. This encourages water allocations away from 
the agricultural sector either through markets or through centralized reallocations. Managing 
water so as to secure sustainable development, food security and rural livelihoods is 
becoming increasingly critical, while remaining bulk water supply augmentation schemes are 
becoming prohibitively costly in both environmental and economic terms. As a consequence 
water demand management is increasingly taking centre stage in water management debates.  
Water pricing is regarded as an important component of managing the demand for water 
resources, yet experience with water pricing as an effective water management tool has been 
mixed at best. In the case of inelastic demand for irrigation water and limited scope for 
reducing on farm water consumption, increasing water prices may decrease agricultural 
production and food security with negligible quantities of irrigation water saved. The present 
study will attempt to investigate the efficacy of increasing irrigation water tariffs to save 
water and the impact thereof on the national and Western Cape economies using the 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model and Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
constructed by Hassan et al (2008).  
2 Water Management in South Africa  
South Africa is divided into 19 Water Management Areas (WMA’s). The four WMA’s found 
in the Western Cape are the Olifants/Doorn WMA, the Berg WMA, the Gouritz WMA and 
the Breede WMA. In aggregate the Western Cape is experiencing a water deficit, with only 
the Breede WMA benefiting from a water surplus.  The Western Cape is therefore facing a 
three tier problem: firstly, surface water resources are nearly fully utilized; secondly, there 
are limited bulk surface water augmentation options left; finally, water demand, especially in 
urban areas, is continually increasing. Water resource decision-making challenges are 
accordingly shifting to demand management.      4 
 
Water pricing is an integral part of integrated water resource management (Louw & Van 
Sckalkwyk, 2001). In South Africa, since 1999, the water pricing strategy requires that the 
agricultural sector pays a raw water charge and in 2002 a water resource management charge 
was introduced (DWAF, 2001). The raw water charge now consists of an operation and 
maintenance charge, a charge for the depreciation of government schemes and a catchment 
management charge. Farmers will not necessarily pay all three charges, but the catchment 
management charge is paid by all. The catchment management charge is applied at the WMA 
level. A summary of the Department of Water Affair’s (DWA) 2009/2010 catchment 
management charges and infrastructure operation and management charges for the Western 
Cape are given in Table 1.  
Table 1: DWA Water Charges for 2009/2010 
Catchment Management Charges  c/m³ 
Berg WMA  0.94 
Breede WMA  0.80 
Gouritz WMA  0.94 
Olifants-Doorn WMA  0.88 
Infrastructure Operation & Maintenance Charges   c/m³ 
Western Cape (Average)  4.85 
                     (DWA, 2009) 
3 Water Demand Management  
Water demand management functions at the micro management level: the productive and 
allocative efficiency of water is improved by moving water to higher value uses via quotas, 
licenses, water prices and water markets and by securing efficiency gains via the adoption of 
more efficient water use practices. With growing water shortages economic benefit can be 
increased by increasing output per unit of water; in other words, by increasing water 
productivity (Barker et al, 2003).    
Water demand management is regarded as important in South Africa and in the Western 
Cape. In the agricultural sector water conservation arguments are concerned with increasing 
water productivity by, for example, minimizing leakages, promoting better use of land and 
water and adopting water saving technologies. There is, however, no clear conception on how 
to approach agricultural demand management given the lack of accurate information on the 5 
 
quantity and character of agricultural water use. In this context pricing and water markets 
become attractive tools to manage water as these approaches are less dependent on 
centralized knowledge on agricultural water use and rather allow for a decentralized market 
selection of the most efficient use of water.  
Water Markets 
The requirements for the success of water markets are well-defined, secure and transferable 
water rights and the full costs and benefits of the market transfer must be borne by the market 
participants (Yesufu & Yesufu, 2006: 5). In addition, trading will only occur as long as the 
transaction costs do not exceed the tradable price of water; if transaction costs in the market 
are too high for buyers and sellers, the market will fail.  
In the South African context, in which water is regarded as national property, the nature of 
water allocations and management institutions makes it difficult to meet the requirements of 
water markets. There are also fears that “the promotion of water markets puts inefficient 
users and related families outside of the productive sector” (Lahmandi-Ayed & Matoussi, 
2003: 65). Water markets may thus be inequitable and hinder pro-poor development. These 
fears are especially acute in South Africa in which the national water policy priority is Water 
Allocation Reform and pro-poor development. There are thus considerable developmental 
and political barriers to the full implementation of water markets. Despite this, trading in 
water rights is permitted and some trading is taking place, albeit on a small scale.      
Water Pricing 
Three main reasons for increasing the price of irrigation water can be identified; namely, cost 
recovery, encouraging the efficient use of water resources and collecting financial resources 
to benefit the beneficiaries of water services (de Fraiture & Perry, 2007). Pricing as a policy 
is first and foremost a tool for cost recovery and there are few examples of the successful 
management of water via marginal water pricing (Molle & Berkoff, 2007; Montginoul, 2007; 
Dinar  et al, 1997). Water pricing is a problematic policy tool: firstly, adjusting prices 
upwards will always be met with resistance; secondly, demand for irrigation water is 
inelastic; and thirdly, designing accurate pricing structures still requires accurate information 
on the quantity of water used as well as the true value of water – both pieces of information 
are notoriously difficult to obtain (Lahmandi-Ayed & Matoussi, 2003; Yesufu & Yesufu, 
2006)).  6 
 
The inelasticity of demand is one of the biggest stumbling blocks to the efficacy of pricing: 
elasticity values provide an indication of the level at which consumers will respond to price 
levels; and, low elasticity indicates that prices will have to be increased by a large amount 
before consumers will respond. Irrigation water demand may be inelastic due to its low share 
in production costs and the existence of few substitutes.  Evidence at the household level 
suggests that economic incentives may have some impact on water consumption, but may not 
be sufficient by themselves to affect behaviour change (Clark & Finley, 2007).  
Reliable empirical estimates of irrigation demand and the elasticity of irrigation demand are 
scarce, and the full labour and capital costs associated with changing water use is often not 
taken into account (Molle & Berkoff, 2007; Kim & Schaible, 2000). Markets for irrigation 
water are small and not yet well developed, which means that there are not sufficient buyers 
and sellers to give a reliable estimate of the price of irrigation water at different quantities. 
Linear programming and econometric models are thus developed to derive demand for 
irrigation water. Though results are mixed and scarce, the dominant finding is that demand 
for domestic and irrigation water is inelastic (Jansen & Schulz, 2006; Appels et al, 2004; 
Pagan  et al, 1997; Amir & Fisher, 1999; Veck & Bill, 2000; Van Vuuren et al, 2004; 
Olmstead et al, 2007). Further empirical findings suggest the existence of water demand 
curves that have both elastic and inelastic segments (Jansen & Schulz, 2006; de Fraiture & 
Perry, 2007; Grové & Oosthuizen, 2009; Bontemps & Couture, 2002). There is a maximum 
amount of water an irrigator will take even if the water price is zero (de Fraiture & Perry, 
2007; Grové & Oosthuizen, 2009). At low prices water demand is, therefore, constrained by 
agricultural requirements and so unresponsive to prices. As prices increase, water demand 
becomes relatively more responsive.   
Irrigators can respond to an increased water price by leaving land uncultivated, by applying 
less water and accepting the risk of a lower yield, by changing cropping patterns and by 
investing in more efficient irrigation technology. As a water demand management tool, 
increased irrigation water prices may firstly result in adjustments in on-farm water 
management practices, followed by changes in cropping, followed by changes in irrigation 
technology and as a last resort the reallocation of water to other sectors (Molle & Berkoff, 
2007: 33; Moore et al, 1994). Existing technology, past investment decisions, financial 
viability and labour and management costs all impact on substitution possibilities with labour 
and capital, which in turn impacts on the ability to change water management regimes and 
cropping patterns (de Fraiture & Perry, 2007: 96-97, Molle & Berkoff, 2007: 29, 70). Unless 7 
 
the ease of substitution between factors is high, changing water management regimes will 
entail high costs and may consequently not be feasible for low-income farmers and may be 
politically unpopular (Molle & Berkoff, 2007: 102).   
Lack of information and lack of trust may also impact on irrigation water use – irrigators may 
not know how much to irrigate, trust information they are given, trust the authorities or have 
full information of technology choices (Feder et al, 2004: 274). Irrigators may also 
experience loss aversion, meaning that they would rather over-irrigate than risk under-
irrigating and suffering adverse effects on crop and soil quality (Feder et al, 1985: 274; 
Leviston et al, 2005). Loss aversion may be particularly acute for irrigators inexperienced 
with more efficient technologies while also facing high cost and revenue uncertainties 
(Dalton et al, 2004: 221). More efficient technology adoption may also be influenced by 
experience such that adoptions increase with the age of irrigator; but evidence in this regard 
is mixed (Mateos-Planas, 2004; Lilienfeld & Asmild, 2007). When faced with extreme events 
such as droughts or sufficiently high prices, irrigators may be more likely to participate in 
markets in the short-run, to smooth consumption, or wait for new information than to make 
irreversible investment decisions (Carey & Zilberman, 2002; Mulder, 2005).  
Given the inelasticity of water demand, limited substitutes for irrigation water, risk aversion 
and the low share of water in total costs, increasing irrigation tariffs may have a limited 
impact on decreasing quantities of irrigation water used on farms. The impact may also be 
less than expected at the basin level. On-farm water savings only translate into overall water 
demand reductions if the amount of irrigated land is not expanded; thus land and water must 
be managed together (Dinar & Mody, 2004: 113; Skaggs, 2001; Wester et al, 2007). If 
consumption is not decreased when prices increase, pricing as a management tool is 
ineffective and alternative demand management mechanisms will need to be explored (Jansen 
& Schulz, 2006: 594).   
4 Model and data 
The computable general equilibrium (CGE) model used in the study is a further development 
of the standard CGE model developed at IFPRI (International Food and Policy Research 
Institute). The model has a specific focus on agriculture and water, obtained through 
distinguishing 17 agricultural industry categories and the 19 WMA’s of South Africa in the 
SAM for South Africa for 2002. The CGE model and SAM was constructed by Hassan et al 8 
 
(2008) to trace the macro and micro water policy impacts on water use within the South 
African economy. The only adjustment that was made to the model for purposes of this study 
was the adjustment of the constant elasticity of substitution between different factors of 
production as discussed in section 6. The following discussion on the model and underlying 
data is based on the report by Hassan et al (2008) and some own interpretations based on the 
CGE model and SAM. 
Production  
40 sectors/commodities are modelled, of which 17 are agricultural and 15 are industrial. 
Three utility sectors are also identified, namely electricity, domestic water distribution and 
energy water distribution. The agricultural sector distinguishes production of field crops 
(summer cereals; winter cereals; oil crops and legumes; fodder crops; cotton and tobacco; and 
sugarcane), horticultural crops (vegetables; citrus fruit; subtropical fruit; deciduous fruit and 
viticulture; and other horticulture), various livestock categories, as well as fishing and 
forestry. Field crops are further separated into irrigated and dryland crops, but all 
horticultural crops are regarded as irrigated.  
The novel feature of the model by Hassan et al (2008) is that production and consumption are 
modelled by WMA. All production sectors, labour, land, water and household categories are 
identified by WMA in the SAM, capturing the varying importance of agriculture and other 
sectors in the different parts of the country. This regional distinction in the underlying data is 
particularly relevant since water management and policy institutions in South Africa use the 
WMA as the principal geographic unit of planning. Commodities are not distinguished by 
WMA, i.e. the assumption is that producers in each region supply their output to a national 
commodity market from where the products are further distributed.  
The model includes six factors of production that are available to the agricultural industries, 
namely three labour types (unskilled, skilled and highly skilled), capital, land and irrigation 
water. The payments for factors of production by different sectors are based on salaries and 
wages for labour, investment returns for capital and rental returns for land. Returns for 
irrigation water are based on estimated shadow prices of irrigation water for different 
irrigated crops per region, which are dependent on production levels, yields and productivity 
effects of water on crop yields. According to Hassan et al (2008) shadow prices were 
calculated by running Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions on an estimated quadratic 
water-yield response function, using the coefficients to estimate the value of the marginal 9 
 
product of water to agricultural production (VMP) and then subtracting the non-water 
irrigation costs from the VMP. The total shadow value of production of different crops is then 
estimated for each region by estimating region specific yields of different crops and 
multiplying this with the shadow price per hectare of land. Subtracting this shadow value 
from the capital value added of each crop allows for the use of agricultural water as a factor 
of production in the model.  
Two additional factors of production are included: domestic water for the domestic water 
distribution sector, and energy water for the energy water distribution sector. The domestic 
water distribution sector supplies water to all sectors that use water as an intermediate good, 
as well as to households, whereas the energy water distribution sector supplies water solely to 
the electricity sector. Returns to factors are distributed to households based on their 
ownership of these factors and ownership of land is used as a proxy for ownership of 
irrigation water. 
The agricultural activities have a unique production technology for each WMA based on 
regional information from Agricultural Census results, but the production technology of non-
agricultural sectors was drawn from the national use tables published by Statistics South 
Africa with the implicit assumption that the production technology of non-agricultural sectors 
is not influenced by location. The production technology reflects the combination of inputs 
used in the production of a unit of output. In order to maintain these production technologies, 
each production sector uses intermediate inputs in fixed relative shares regardless the level of 
production according to a Leontief specification. It is also assumed that intermediate inputs 
cannot be substituted for factors of production, e.g. chemicals cannot be substituted for by 
labour. Composite intermediate inputs and composite factors of production are therefore also 
combined under a Leontief specification. 
Limited substitution between the different production factors are allowed with a Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function, e.g. labour can be substituted for capital, or land for 
water, etc. The elasticity of substitution is set exogenously and the selection of the elasticity 
for this study is discussed in more detail in section 6. 
Domestic and International Trade 
Producers are driven by their pursuit of higher returns and can do so in both the domestic and 
international market. Substitution between production for the domestic and foreign market 
occurs under the conditions of a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function and 10 
 
substitution between domestic and international goods for consumption occurs under the 
conditions of a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) Armington specification. The choice 
of market is dependent on relative prices. Agricultural exports in South Africa are dominated 
by horticultural products, while total exports are dominated by mining and metals. A small-
country assumption is adopted such that South Africa is faced with perfectly elastic world 
demand and supply and fixed world prices. South Africa is thus a price taker and a single 
supply price, export and import price and exchange rate are accordingly endogenously fixed 
in the model. Finally, in order to allow for the current account balance to be fixed in foreign 
currency a measure of the exchange rate is included which consists of an index of the relative 
price of tradables to non-tradables (Hassan et al, 2008)    
Institutions 
Institutions in this CGE model consist of households and government, since no enterprise 
account is included. Households are disaggregated across WMA, rural and urban areas and 
income quintiles, representing 190 different household groups. Households receive incomes 
from salaries and wages, returns to capital, land and water. The levels of income are 
dependent on the production levels of the sectors, as well as the distribution of factor 
ownership amongst households. Main expenditure items of households include consumption 
of products via a Linear Expenditure System (LES) of demand, direct taxes to government, 
savings based on their marginal propensity to save and transfers to the rest of the world. 
Considerable differences exist in per capita consumption patterns between regions: WMA’s 
with the largest rural populations also have the lowest consumption, while consumption in 
agricultural is mainly subsistence based. The exception is cases where the WMA contains 
many large commercial farmers or is located in close proximity to a large urban centre (for 
instance, the Berg WMA). (Hassan et al, 2008)  
With regard to the government, the point to note in the context of this study is that 
government receives income from taxes and tariffs. Included in the model is a tariff on 
irrigation water use, hence it is only paid by irrigation agricultural sectors. The tariff is 
included at 2c per cubic meter in the base case (2002 values), compared to the average of 
5.8c per cubic meter in 2009 as discussed in section 2. The government also engages in the 
consumption of commodities, transfers to households and the rest of the world, and lastly 
savings.  
Investment, capital and rest of the world 11 
 
Investment is financed from all savings from households, enterprises, government and the 
rest of the world. There is also a capital and rest of world account. (Hassan et al, 2008)     
Closure rules 
All factors of production, excluding capital, are identified per region and are used by the 
sectors in the same region. A certain set of model assumptions (closure rules) can be used to 
allow land, water and labour to move between sectors within a WMA but not between 
WMA’s. Only capital can move between sectors and WMA’s. Closure rules also allow for 
assumptions between full employment and unemployment for factors of production. For 
purposes of this study higher skilled labour and capital are assumed to be fully employed 
with flexible real wages, while the supply of unskilled labour is perfectly elastic at fixed 
nominal wage rate, i.e. assuming some level of unemployment for unskilled and skilled 
labour. The assumptions for water are different for the two scenarios and will be discussed in 
section 6. 
The three macroeconomic accounts (government balance, current account and savings and 
investment account) need to be brought into balance and this is achieved via closure rules. 
Hassan et al (2008) opt for a balanced closure rule which specifies a nominal change in total 
absorption that is evenly distributed between the spending and investment demand of the 
public and private sectors. Government spending can be increased via an increase in taxes. 
The closure rule thus ensures that adjustments in households’ propensity to save are 
proportional such that savings and investment are in equilibrium. For the current account, the 
closure rule maintains fixed levels of foreign savings by adjustments in a measure of the real 
exchange rate. For the purposes of the current study the closures remain similar to those used 
by Hassan et al (2008), with the scenarios focusing on the increase in government tax (water 
tariff). 
5 Scenarios  
There are two main aims for deciding to increase irrigation water charges; to manage water 
demand and to improve the cost recovery of catchment management. These aims should be 
achieved with as little loss of welfare in agriculture (especially low-income agriculture) as 
possible and without threatening economic growth or food security. In the model only a 
single charge is given and therefore the percentage increase will be levied on the entire 
charge. The charge will be levied at the national level, and impacts will be examined 12 
 
nationally and in the four WMA’s that are situated in the Western Cape, namely: the Berg 
WMA, the Olifants/Doorn WMA, the Breede WMA and the Gouritz WMA.  
In this section two scenarios will be investigated. In both scenarios the water tariff is 
increased by 50 percent from a base of 2c/m³. In the first scenario water demand is fixed 
within agriculture within each WMA. This implies that as the water tariff increases 
agriculture is forced to take up the water, and water is only permitted to move between 
agricultural industries in the same WMA. The treatment of land and water is similar. The 
manner in which shifts will occur within agriculture is influenced by the shadow prices of 
water (factor returns) set for the different crops. In the second scenario it is assumed that all 
water does not have to be used, i.e. some level of ‘unemployment’ is allowed and water is 
still mobile between different agricultural crops within the same WMA.  
One of the questions that this study aims to answer is by how much water consumption will 
be reduced nationally and in the Western Cape if prices are increased. There is a rigid water 
licensing structure in place accompanied by an ineffective water market, which means that 
irrigators have little incentive to reduce water consumption and may therefore rather use their 
full allocation. On the other hand, a structure for water markets is in place and it is possible 
for farmers to either sell water rights or not take up their water rights. The reality of the scope 
for movements in water in South Africa is therefore situated between the first and second 
scenarios.  
In both scenarios a low elasticity of substitution between factors of 0.2 is set. This choice is 
justified in so far as there is a limited possibility for agriculture to substitute labour and 
capital for water. Substituting water with labour and capital may entail making irreversible 
long-term investment decisions, to which irrigators may be averse. At an elasticity of 
substitution of 0.2, the model cannot solve for increases in the water tariff greater than 250% 
(5c/m³) if water is fully employed.  
6 Model results  
The increase in the water tariff causes a shift from lower value field crops to higher value 
horticulture. In the first scenario it is assumed that there is still demand for all irrigation water 
despite the increase in the cost of water and the assumption is that water is only be mobile 
within a WMA, not between WMA’s. Table 2 shows that on a national level 71.5 million m³ 
is reallocated from field crops to horticulture, while 46.2 million m³ is similarly reallocated in 13 
 
the Western Cape with the Gouritz WMA accounting for 50% (23.0 million m³) of the 
reallocation. In the Western Cape the bulk of the irrigation water is reallocated from lower 
value fodder (-56.7  million  m³) to deciduous fruit (32.4  million  m³) and vegetables 
(14.8 million m³). Hassan et al (2008) find that horticultural crops have a high willingness to 
pay for irrigated water; therefore, irrigation of horticultural crops does not decline with rising 
prices, but rather increases in all regions except the Berg WMA. 
For scenario 2 it is assumed that as the cost of irrigation water increases the demand for 
irrigation water will decrease relative to supply. On a national level 463.4 million m³, or 6.4% 
of irrigation water, will remain unused, compared to 128.8 million m³ (7.5%) of irrigation 
water in the Western Cape. This unused water must be seen in the context of the 
56 million m³ yield and 127 million m³ gross capacity of the Berg River Dam. This is a large 
quantity of potential water savings. Irrigation water can, however, not necessarily remain 
‘unused’ to the extent that the model allows in scenario 2, and therefore real water savings if 
prices were to be increased would not necessarily be as high. It is unclear where on the scale 
between scenario 1 and scenario 2 South Africa is situated. In addition, this water ‘saving’ is 
scattered between WMA’s and crops, and a large capital outlay for storage and pumping 
would be necessary for full use of the ‘saved’ water. The ability to use water for other crops 
is also dependent on factors other than water availability; for instance, soil quality, crop 
suitability, and climate. 
On a national level the greatest decrease in demand for water is from field crops 
(384.4  million  m³) compared to 79  million  m³ for horticulture. This is in contrast to the 
Western Cape where field crops and horticulture’s demand decreases by 65.1 and 
63.7  million  m3 respectively. Horticulture dominates agriculture in the Western Cape. 
Comparing the four WMA’s of the Western Cape the Breede WMA will show the greatest 
decrease in demand for water, namely 53.8 million m3. Although all results included in this 
study are available at the WMA level, only the change in demand for water is reported at this 
level. 
Table 2: Change in demand for water 












South Africa  7 273.9  0.0  0.0  -463.4  -6.4 
Field crops  4 155.8  -71.5  -1.7  -384.4  -9.3 14 
 
Horticulture 3  118.1  71.5  2.3  -79.0  -2.5 
Western Cape  1 708.6  0.0  0.0  -128.8  -7.5 
Field crops  204.8  -46.2  -22.5  -65.1  -31.8 
Summer Cereals  9.1  1.0  10.8  -0.5  -5.0 
Winter Cereals  50.5  8.3  16.5  -1.6  -3.1
Oils and Legumes  3.1  0.3  9.3  -0.1  -3.6 
Fodder 140.0  -56.7  -40.5  -63.1  -45.1 
Cotton and Tobacco  2.1  1.0  44.8  0.1  6.3 
Horticulture 1  503.8  46.2  3.1  -63.7  -4.2 
Vegetables 206.6  14.8  7.1  3.6  1.8 
Citrus Fruits  73.8  -0.3  -0.3  -2.6  -3.5 
Subtropical Fruits  6.2  1.1  17.5  0.5  8.5 
Deciduous Fruits  1 132.9  32.4  2.9  -59.9  -5.3 
Other Horticulture  84.2  -1.9  -2.2  -5.4  -6.4 
Gouritz  128.7 0.0  0.0  -31.9  -24.8 
Field crops  78.2  -23.0  -29.3  -31.6  -40.3 
Horticulture 50.4  23.0  45.5  -0.4  -0.8 
Olifants/Doorn  497.0 0.0  0.0 -8.4  -1.7 
Field crops  48.0  -15.4  -32.1  -17.3  -36.1 
Horticulture 449.0  15.4  3.4  8.9  2.0 
Breede  647.5 0.0  0.0  -53.8  -8.3 
Field crops  49.9  -10.5  -21.1  -14.9  -30.0 
Horticulture 597.6  10.5  1.8  -38.9  -6.5 
Berg  435.4 0.0  0.0  -34.6  -8.0 
Field crops  28.7  2.7  9.4  -1.3  -4.5 
Horticulture 406.7  -2.7  -0.7  -33.3  -8.2 
 
The changes in demand for water are also reflected in the demand for land for irrigation. The 
impact of reallocation of water between different crops can be seen in the changes in the 
areas of agricultural crops as reported in Table 3. On a national level and on WMA level land 
is assumed to be fully utilised in both scenarios. The only reallocation is therefore between 
dryland and irrigation. On a national level if water is fully utilized (scenario 1) 34 540 ha will 
revert to dryland, but 132 300 ha irrigated land will revert to dryland if water is not fully 
utilized (scenario 2). Similarly there is a shift from irrigated land to dryland in the Western 
Cape.  
Table 3: Change in demand for land 











South Africa crops  7 628.71 0 0 0  0
Irrigated agriculture  1 560.72 -34.54 -2.21 -132.27  -8.4715 
 
Field crops  923.74 -40.46 -4.38 -111.31  -12.05
Horticulture 636.98 5.91 0.93 -20.96  -3.29
Dryland agriculture  6 067.99 34.54 0.57 132.27  2.18
Western Cape crops  1 116.98 0 0 0  0
Irrigated agriculture  406.01 -10.58 -2.61 -40.99  -10.10
Field crops  88.57 -17.06 -19.26 -25.07  -28.30
Horticulture 317.44 6.48 2.04 -15.93  -5.02
Dryland agriculture  710.97 10.58 1.49 40.99  5.77
 
The changes in demand for water and land are accompanied by changes in demand for labour 
as reported in table 4. The shift from irrigated land to dryland in the Western Cape if water is 
not fully utilized (scenario 2) is accompanied by a decline in employment of 3 561 persons in 
irrigated agriculture. If water is fully utilized in the Western Cape (scenario 1) employment 
increases in irrigated agriculture by 573 persons due to the reallocation of water to high value 
crops such as deciduous fruit and vegetables, while employment declines by 294 persons in 
dryland agriculture. On a national level, the employment declines in both scenarios, but there 
is a greater decline in employment if water is not fully utilized in agriculture (8 800 persons 
versus 1 829 persons).  
Table 4: Change in demand for labour (numbers) 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2 





South Africa   8 238 848 -1 829 -0.02 -8 800  -0.11
Western Cape   1 336 530 90 0.01 -3 020  -0.23
Western Cape Agriculture  108 855 266 0.24 -3 408  -3.13
Irrigation  58 814 573 0.97 -3 561  -6.05
Dryland 8  972 -294 -3.28 182  2.03
Other agriculture  41 069 -13 -0.03 -29  -0.07
Western Cape Non agriculture  1 227 670 -177 -0.01 386  0.03
 
The change in the average output price and commodity supply price of all crops is reported in 
table 5. If water is fully utilized in agriculture (scenario 1), the average output price and 
commodity supply price of all crops, except vegetables, citrus fruit and deciduous fruit 16 
 
increases. If water is not fully utilized in agriculture (scenario 2), there is an increase in all 
these prices for all crops. Of particular concern in both scenarios is the increase in price of 
cereals as this has an impact on the prices of staple foods, which may have important 
implications for household welfare.   
Table 5: Change in prices 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
% Change in 
Average Output 
Price 
% Change in 
Commodity 
Supply Price 
% Change in 
Average Output 
Price 
% Change in 
Commodity 
Supply Price 
Summer Cereals  0.31 0.36 0.84  0.97
Winter Cereals  0.25 0.25 0.80  0.81
Oils 0.34 0.41 0.82  1.00
Fodder 1.25 1.29 1.59  1.64
Sugar 0.55 0.55 1.14  1.14
Cotton 0.46 0.53 0.84  0.96
Vegetables -0.54 -0.56 0.45  0.48
Citrus Fruit  -0.40 -1.08 0.66  2.38
Subtropical Fruit  0.14 0.18 1.05  1.29
Deciduous Fruit  -0.11 -0.14 0.77  2.29
Other Horticulture  0.65 1.03 0.97  1.55
 
Household consumption expenditure is taken as a proxy for household welfare and is 
reported in table 6. Nationally, the household consumption expenditure declines across all 
urban and rural quintiles in both scenarios. The decline is greater for the lowest three rural 
quintiles than the lowest three urban quintiles, where the lower quintiles indicate poorer 
households.  
In the Western Cape, if water is fully utilized (scenario 1), household consumption 
expenditure increases for the first four rural quintiles and first three urban quintiles. The 
increase in welfare of the lower urban quintiles in the Western Cape can perhaps be ascribed 
to the increase in horticultural activity in the region. Household consumption expenditure in 17 
 
the Western Cape declines for the rural quintile 5, which reflects an income effect from the 
increase in the water tariff; farmers are absorbing irrigation water at higher prices. 
In the Western Cape, if water is not fully utilized (scenario 2), household consumption 
declines for all rural and urban quintiles; however, the decline is greater for urban households 
than rural households for all quintiles. The welfare of all households nationally and in the 
Western Cape is therefore adversely affected and the poverty impact may be noteworthy. For 
all rural and urban quintiles, the welfare impact is more severe if water is not fully utilized 
than if water is fully utilized.   
Table 6: Change in household expenditure 
  Scenario 1   Scenario 2 
  Base Change 
(level) 





733.43 -0.53 -0.07 -1.40 -0.19
Rural households  153.27 -0.02 -0.02 -0.16  -0.11
Quintiles 1,2,3  57.99 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06  -0.10
Quintiles 4,5  95.28 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11  -0.11
Urban households  580.17 -0.51 -0.09 -1.24  -0.21
Quintiles 1,2,3  47.26 0.00 -0.01 -0.03  -0.07
Quintiles 4,5  532.91 -0.50 -0.09 -1.20  -0.23
Western Cape 
households 
123.88 -0.07 -0.06 -0.32 -0.26
Rural households  9.90 0.02 0.16 -0.08  -0.79
Quintiles 1,2,3  1.75 0.00 0.18 -0.01  -0.29
Quintiles 4,5  8.15 0.01 0.15 -0.07  -0.89
Urban households  113.98 -0.09 -0.08 -0.25  -0.22
Quintiles 1,2,3  6.17 0.00 0.07 -0.01  -0.20
Quintiles 4,5  107.81 -0.09 -0.08 -0.23  -0.22
 
The percentage change in trade is reported in table 7. For the agricultural sector the result of 
concern is that more field crops are imported while less are exported, and this impact is more 
severe if water is not fully utilized in agriculture (scenario 2). This result, combined with the 
national decline in production of cereals (57 380mt in the case of scenario 1 and 59 230mt in 
the case of scenario 2) not shown here, raises concern in terms of food security as domestic 
supply of staple foods decreases and the price thereof increase. If water is not fully utilized in 
agriculture, there is also a decline in horticultural exports, particularly deciduous fruit 
(6.42%). If water is not fully utilized, agricultural exports decline by 2.73% compared to a 
0.90% increase in agricultural imports, while industrial and service exports increase and 18 
 
imports decrease. If water is fully utilized, the imports and exports of industry and services 
increase, except for services exports.    
Table 7: Change in trade (% change in quantity) 
Exports Imports 
Scenario  1 Scenario  2 Scenario  1 Scenario  2 
Summer Cereals  -0.70 -1.80 0.40  1.02
Winter Cereals  -1.77 -5.13 1.05  2.87
Oils and Legumes  -1.87 -4.37 0.49  1.11
Fodder -4.74 -6.30 0  0
Cotton and Tobacco  -0.48 -1.21 0.11  -0.12
Vegetables 1.24 -1.71 0
Citrus Fruit  2.04 -5.25 -1.43  3.34
Subtropical Fruit  -0.59 -3.57 0  0
Deciduous Fruit  0.34 -6.42 0  0
Other Horticulture  -3.05 -4.92 0.76  0.91
Livestock 0.01 -0.05 -0.02  -0.12
Livestock products  0.03 0.03 0.03  0.00
Fishing 0.07 0.16 -0.02  -0.14
Forestry 0 0 -0.02  -0.04
Agriculture 0.16 -2.73 0.34  0.90
Industry 0.01 0.14 0.00  -0.06
Services -0.01 0.01 0.00  -0.05
Total Exports  0.01 0.05 0.01  -0.04
 
Key macroeconomic indicators are reported in table 8. There is a decline in all key 
macroeconomic indicators, except for government income from the water tariff. The decline 
is greater if water is not fully utilized, and government income from the water tariff is less if 19 
 
water is not fully utilized than in the case of full utilization of water. These results are 
indicative of a decline in national welfare. 
Table 8: Change in key indicators (nominal – Rmillion) 







(level) Change  (%)
GDP (Market Prices)  1 168 390 -860 -0.074 -2 220  -0.190
Exports 378  890 -280 -0.074 -750  -0.198
Imports 338  200 -240 -0.071 -682  -0.202
Fixed Investment  175 930 -130 -0.074 -336  -0.191
Private Consumption  733 430 -530 -0.072 -1 403  -0.191
Government Consumption  215 300 -150 -0.070 -412  -0.191
Government water tariff income  145 73 50.34 59  40.91
7 Summary of Results: Implications for the Agricultural Sector   
The reality in South Africa lies between the two scenarios under investigation. Although 
water markets do exist and water rights do not have to be taken up by farmers, water markets 
are still very rigid in South Africa and if farmers do not take up their water rights they risk 
losing their rights permanently.  
If the reality is close to the first scenario, in which water is fully utilized, agriculture will be 
unable to ‘save’ water if water tariffs are increased by 50%; but, structural and production 
changes will occur within agriculture; there is a general trend of a reallocation of water from 
low value crops to high value crops. The same general trend is evident in the Western Cape. 
The Western Cape is dominated by horticultural crops and demand for land and water for 
horticulture increases for most of the Western Cape. 
These structural shifts raise concern for the risk profile of agriculture and food security. On a 
macroeconomic level these structural changes lead to more field crops being imported and 
less exported. Taken together, these impacts lead to rising prices of agricultural commodities, 
and of special concern is the rising price of cereals. Rising prices of staple foods may have an 
important poverty impact. Indeed, nationally, urban and rural household consumption 20 
 
expenditure declines and the rural poor are more adversely affected than the urban poor. 
Finally, national welfare declines in nominal terms as evidenced by a decline in key 
macroeconomic indicators.   
If the reality is closer to the second scenario, in which water is not fully utilized, irrigated 
agriculture will decline in scope in addition to structural changes, while water can be ‘saved’. 
The impact of increasing the water tariff by 50% if water is not fully utilized is to decrease 
the quantity of land and water demanded, to decrease employment in agriculture, to increase 
prices, to decrease household welfare and increase the imports of field crops. In the lower 
quintiles, households are more severely affected in rural areas. This in turn adversely impacts 
on rural livelihoods and food security; especially when considering the sharp decline in 
irrigated field crops. Again, national welfare declines in nominal terms as evidenced by a 
decline in all key macroeconomic indicators. The amount of water that can be ‘saved’ (128.8 
million m³ of unused water in the Western Cape) may be of note, but the extent to which 
irrigation water can remain unused in reality is unclear, and the capital costs required to 
reallocate this water must be taken into account in addition to the feasibility of switching to 
alternative crops. 
What is evident though is that, for both scenarios, the risk profile of agriculture increases, 
food security may be threatened, national welfare declines, imports of staple foods increase, 
prices of staple foods increase, household welfare declines and employment in agriculture 
declines. These adverse effects are more severe in the second scenario than in the first 
scenario.   
8 Conclusion 
The potential impact of increased irrigation water tariffs on the Western Cape economy is to 
decrease agricultural production and food security with the possibility of a limited impact on 
actual quantities of water saved (it is not clear where on the scale between scenario 1 and 2 
South Africa is situated). In addition, the socio-economic effect of increasing tariffs is 
regressive. Thus, increasing water tariffs may not be a useful demand management tool in 
South Africa. Tariffs should rather be used as a tool for cost recovery for infrastructure and 
the management of catchments and should always be approached with caution. This result 
conforms to the international experience of limited success with the use of pricing for 
demand management and the recognition that pricing is first and foremost a cost recovery 21 
 
tool. Careful consideration must also be given to the rigidity of South Africa’s water 
licensing and water markets. This rigidity implies that any alteration in the allocation of water 
may be fairly permanent and will have long-run implications for the security of agriculture 
and the Western Cape economy. Water is a key constraint to development in the Western 
Cape and is important for the maintenance of rural livelihoods; thus, when considering these 
results it is important that the introduction of irrigation water pricing shocks be approached 
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